In McLean and Postlewaite (Econometrica 56, 1992, p. 2421), we analyzed pure exchange economies with asymmetrically informed agents. We defined a notion of informational size and showed that, when the aggregate information of all agents resolves nearly all the uncertainty regarding the state of nature, the conflict between incentive compatibility and (ex post) efficiency can be made small if agents have sufficiently small informational size. This paper investigates the relationship between informational size and efficiency for the case in which nontrivial aggregate uncertainty is present, i.e., when significant uncertainty about the world persists even when the information of all agents is known.
Introduction
It is well understood that, in the presence of asymmetric information, incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency often conflict: agents may benefit from misrepresenting their private information when that information is to be used in making decisions that affect them. In McLean and Postlewaite (2002) , we addressed certain continuity issues when agents have small amounts of information that is not common knowledge. Much research in economics ignores the issue of asymmetry of information, implicitly or explicitly assuming that the characteristics of the economic environment are common knowledge among agents even though the assumption that all agents are identically informed is implausible. This working assumption greatly simplifies the analysis and is based on a belief that behavior should be continuous with respect to the information structure. When the asymmetry of information is 'small enough,' predicted behavior when asymmetries are ignored should be close to predicted behavior when these asymmetries are properly modeled.
McLean and Postlewaite (2002) formally address this question by introducing a measure of an agent's informational size and show that, in some cases, the unavoidable inefficiencies caused by incentive problems can be made small when agents have sufficiently small informational size. In that paper, two aspects of the informational structure are important. The first aspect is aggregate uncertainty: to what extent does the agents' information in toto resolve nearly all the uncertainty in the economy? The second is informational variability which, very roughly, measures the degree to which an agent's information is correlated with the information of others. 1 McLean and Postlewaite (2002) restrict attention to the case of negligible aggregate uncertainty in which the agents' information resolves nearly all uncertainty regarding the state of the world and show that many individually rational Pareto efficient allocations can be approximated by incentive compatible allocations when each agent is sufficiently informationally small relative to his informational variability.
In this paper we investigate the relationship between informational size and efficiency in the presence of nontrivial aggregate uncertainty, i.e., when significant uncertainty regarding the world is present even when the information of all agents is known. In the next section, we present the formal model; following this, we discuss in general the question of aggregate uncertainty and the difficulty that aggregate uncertainty presents when trying to identify nearly efficient incentive compatible allocations, even when agents are informationally small.
We then prove the existence of incentive compatible, individually rational and nearly ex post efficient allocations without assuming negligible aggregate uncertainty when each agent has small informational size relative to informational variability. We also show that, for general exchange economies with asymmetric information, the conflict between incentive compatibility and efficiency asymptotically vanishes when an economy is replicated.
Both this paper and McLean and Postlewaite (2002) are related to McLean (1985, 1988) and to subsequent work by McAfee and Reny (1992) . The possibility of full extraction in mechanism design problems also depends on the correlation of agents' information in a way that is related to, but not precisely the same, as our concept of informational variability. This is discussed in detail when that concept is formally introduced below.
Private information economies
The model is similar to that in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) . The interested reader will find a detailed discussion of the model and many of the assumptions there.
Throughout the paper, || · || will denote the 1-norm unless specified otherwise. Let N = {1, 2, . . ., n} denote the set of economic agents. Let Θ = {θ 1 , . . . , θ m } denote the (finite) state space and let T 1 , T 2 , . . . , T n be finite sets where T i represents the set of possible signals that agent i might receive. Let T ≡ T 1 × · · · × T n and T −i ≡ × j =i T i . If t ∈ T , we will often write t = (t −i , t i ). If X is a finite set, define
In our model, nature chooses an element θ ∈ Θ. The state of nature is unobservable but each agent i receives a 'signal' t i that may be correlated with nature's choice of θ . More formally, let (θ,t 1 ,t 2 , . . . ,t n ) be an (n + 1)-dimensional random vector taking values in Θ × T with associated distribution P ∈ ∆ Θ×T where
Without loss of generality, we will make the following 'full support' assumptions regarding the marginal distributions: for each θ ∈ Θ, P (θ) = Prob θ = θ > 0 and for each i ∈ N and for each t i ∈ T i ,
Let T * = {t ∈ T | P (t) > 0}. We note that T * need not be equal to T . If t ∈ T * , let P Θ (· | t) ∈ ∆ Θ denote the induced conditional probability measure on Θ. Let χ θ ∈ ∆ Θ denote the degenerate measure concentrated on state θ .
The consumption set of each agent is + and w i ∈ + denotes the initial endowment of agent i (an agent's initial endowment is independent of the state θ). For each θ ∈ Θ, let u i (·, θ) : + → be the utility function of agent i in state θ . We note that this formulation differs from the more standard formulation that specifies utility functions of the form u i (·, t) , where t is the profile of agents' types. Clearly, our formulation is without loss of generality, since one can always define the space Θ ≡ T . The formulation u i (·, θ) that we have chosen is advantageous for our purposes in that it focuses attention on the manner in which the types of agents different from i will affect agent i's utility. The utility of i for any bundle of goods x depends only on the state of nature θ , and the information of other agents affects i only through the way that information changes the likelihood of different states of nature. This focus simplifies our formulation of informational size below.
Throughout the paper, we make the following assumptions regarding utilities and endowments for each agent i ∈ N :
• Continuity: for each θ ∈ Θ, u i (·, θ) is continuous.
• Monotonicity: if x, y ∈ + , x y and x = y, then u i (x, θ ) > u i (y, θ ).
• Normalization: u i (0, θ) = 0.
• Non-zero endowment: w i = 0.
Each π ∈ ∆ Θ can be associated with a pure exchange economy in which each agent's utility for any bundle x is the expected utility of that bundle given the distribution π on Θ. More formally, the expected economy corresponding to π (expected economy for short) is the pure exchange economy in which agent i has endowment w i and utility
The expected economy corresponding to π will be denoted e(π) = {w i , v i (·, π)} i∈N and we will define e(χ θ ) : = e(θ). For each π ∈ ∆ Θ , an allocation for e(π) is a collection {x i (π)} i∈N satisfying x i (π) ∈ + for each i and i∈N (x i (π) − w i ) 0. For each π ∈ ∆ Θ , an allocation {x i (π)} i∈N for the expected economy e(π) is efficient if there is no other allocation {y i (π)} i∈N for e(π) such that
for each i ∈ N . For each ε 0, an allocation {x i (π)} i∈N for the expected economy e(π) is ε-efficient if there is no other allocation {y i (π)} i∈N for e(π) such that
The collection ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) will be called a private information economy (PIE for short). A PIE allocation z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z n ) for the PIE is a collection of functions z i : T → + satisfying i∈N (z i (t) − w i ) 0 for all t ∈ T . We will not distinguish between w i ∈ + \ {0} and the constant allocation that assigns the bundle w i to agent i for all t ∈ T .
Recall that P Θ (· | t) ∈ ∆ Θ denotes the conditional distribution on Θ given t ∈ T * . Given a PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ), we can define a natural expected economy e(t) := e(P Θ (· | t)) for each t ∈ T * . In this notation, every PIE allocation z for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) induces an allocation z(t) in the expected economy e(t) for each t ∈ T * . Note that e(t) depends on P and we are suppressing this dependence.
A PIE allocation z for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) is:
for all i ∈ N , and all
Note that allocations can depend on agents' types (their information) but not on θ , which is assumed to be unobservable. Hence, our use of the term 'ex post' refers to events that occur after the realization of the signal vector t but before the realization of the state θ .
Nonexclusive information, incentive compatibility, and ex post efficiency
In this section, we address the following question: When can we find a PIE allocation z(·) for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) satisfying IC, XIR, and X 0 E? To illustrate the ideas, we begin with two examples.
Example 1 (Independence). Suppose thatθ andt are independent. Let P Θ denote the marginal of P on Θ. Choose an allocation {x i } i∈N that is individually rational and Pareto efficient for the expected economy e(P Θ ) with utilities
and endowments w i . If we define an allocation z(·) for the PIE as
is XIR, X 0 E, and IC. Note that IC is trivial in this case; when all agents are announcing their types truthfully, the only possible effect that an agent can have on the outcome by misreporting his type is to change the resulting allocation from x to w. This cannot increase any agent's utility since x is individually rational.
Example 2 (Perfect correlation). Suppose that
for each i and that, for each k,
In words, each agent learns the state of nature θ precisely. Hence,
For each k, choose an efficient, individually rational allocation {x i (θ k )} i∈N for the (degenerate) expected economy e(θ k ). If we define an allocation z(·) for the PIE as
is XIR, X 0 E, and IC. As in the first example, incentive compatibility follows from the fact that, whenever all other agents are announcing truthfully, the only possible effect that an agent can have on the outcome by misreporting his type is to change the resulting allocation to w.
The two examples presented above are special cases of the more general concept of nonexclusive information (Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 1986) .
The following (easily proved) lemma provides a simple but useful characterization of NEI. Lemma 1. P ∈ ∆ Θ×T satisfies NEI if and only if, for each i ∈ N and for all t i , t i ∈ T i ,
Examples 1 and 2 above demonstrate that for two particular instances in which NEI holds, there exist incentive compatible, ex post individually rational and ex post efficient mechanisms. The logic of those examples can be generalized, and we show next that if P satisfies NEI, then we can always find incentive compatible, ex post individually rational, ex post efficient mechanisms. 
Clearly, the PIE allocation z(·) is XIR and X 0 E. To prove incentive compatibility, note that
Informational size and variability of beliefs

Informational size
In the mechanism of Proposition 1, agents reveal their types and the announced type profile t is used to construct an updated probability P Θ (· | t) distribution on Θ. The mechanism then specifies an efficient, individually rational allocation for the economy e(P Θ (· | t)). The mechanism is incentive compatible because each agent i is 'informationally small' in the following sense: when agents other than i announce truthfully, there is no residual uncertainty about the state that can be resolved using i's announcement. In other words, i's information is irrelevant if all other agents are announcing truthfully.
An investigation of these issues in a more general framework requires a formal notion of informational size. McLean and Postlewaite (2002) introduced such a notion, which we review.
If t ∈ T * , recall that P Θ (· | t) ∈ ∆ Θ denotes the induced conditional probability measure on Θ and χ θ ∈ ∆ Θ denotes the degenerate measure concentrated on θ . A natural notion of an agent's informational size is the degree to which he can alter the best estimate of the state θ when other agents are announcing truthfully. In our setup, that estimate is the conditional probability distribution on Θ given a profile of types t. Any profile of agents' types t = (t −i , t i ) ∈ T * induces a conditional distribution on Θ and, if agent i unilaterally changes his announced type from t i to t i , this conditional distribution will (in general) change. We consider agent i to be informationally small if, for each t i , there is a 'small' probability that he can effect a non-negligible change in the induced conditional distribution on Θ by changing his announced type from t i to some other t i . This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition. Let
The informational size of agent i is defined as
Loosely speaking, we will say that agent i is informationally small with respect to P if his informational size ν P i is 'small.' If agent i receives signal t i but reports t i = t i , the effect of this misreport is a change in the conditional distribution on
the probability that i can have a non-negligible influence on the conditional distribution on Θ by reporting t i instead of t i when his observed signal is t i . An agent is informationally small if for each of his possible types t i , he assigns small probability to the event that he can have a non-negligible influence on the distribution P Θ (· | t −i , t i ), given his observed type.
If all agents have zero informational size, then P must satisfy NEI. In fact, we have the following result which follows easily from Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. P ∈ ∆ Θ×T satisfies NEI if and only if
We conclude this section with the observation that informational size is not related to the 'quality' of an agent's information regarding the state of nature. In Example 1, an agent's private signal provides no information regarding the realization ofθ (since P Θ (· | t i ) = P Θ (·) for each t i ∈ T i ) while in Example 2, an agent's private signal provides perfect information regarding the realization ofθ (since P Θ (· | t i ) = χ t i for each t i ∈ T i ). Hence, agents may have very good estimates of the true state conditional on their own types, yet each agent is informationally small.
Variability of agents' beliefs
Whether an agent i can be given incentives to reveal his information will depend on the magnitude of the difference between P T −i (· | t i ) and P T −i (· | t i ), the conditional distributions on T −i given different types t i and t i for agent i. To formally define the measure of variability that is convenient for our purposes, we first define a metric d on ∆ Θ as follows: for each α, β ∈ ∆ Θ , let
where · 2 denotes the 2-norm. Hence, d(α, β) measures the Euclidean distance between the Euclidean normalizations of α and β. If P ∈ ∆ Θ×T , recall that P Θ (· | t i ) ∈ ∆ Θ is the conditional distribution on Θ given that i receives signal t i and define
This is the measure of the 'variability' of the conditional distribution P T −i (· | t i ) as a function of t i and we will refer to this informally as the variability of agents' beliefs. 2 As mentioned in the introduction, our work is related to that of McLean (1985, 1988) . Those papers and subsequent work by McAfee and Reny (1992) demonstrated how one can use correlation to fully extract the surplus in certain mechanism design problems. The key ingredient there is the assumption that the collection of conditional distributions {P T −i (· | t i )} t i ∈T i is a linearly independent set for each i. This of course, implies that
While linear independence implies that Ω P i > 0, the actual (positive) size of Ω P i is not relevant in the Cremer-McLean constructions, and full extraction will be possible. In the present work, we do not require that the collection {P T −i (· | t i )} t i ∈T i be linearly independent (or 2 Other essentially equivalent definitions of variability are possible (e.g., min
and we have chosen one that is computationally convenient. This notion of variability of agents' beliefs differs from that in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) and the difference is discussed below.
satisfy the weaker cone condition in Cremer and McLean, 1988) . However, the 'closeness' of the members of {P T −i (· | t i )} t i ∈T i is an important issue. It can be shown that for each i, there exists a collection of numbers z i (t) satisfying 0 z i (t) 1 and
∈T i are all distinct, then the 'incentive compatibility' inequalities above are strict. However, the expression on the left-hand side decreases as Ω P i → 0. Hence, the difference in the expected reward from a truthful report and from a false report will be very small if the conditional posteriors are very close to each other. Our results require that informational size be small relative to the variation in these posteriors.
Small incentives for truthful reporting (i.e., small values of Ω P i ) are not a serious problem in the surplus extraction problem studied by Cremer and McLean since the rewards and punishments can be rescaled so that a false report results in a large negative expected payment. Of course, the punishments themselves may then become very large. However, such rescaling is not possible in our framework for two reasons. First, we deal with pure exchange economies where the feasibility requirement limits the size of punishments. Second, we do not restrict attention to quasilinear preferences. Since agents may be risk averse, punishments and rewards that have small (or zero) expected value can have large negative welfare effects.
Aggregate uncertainty
As mentioned in the introduction, the main concern of this paper is to provide conditions under which nearly efficient incentive compatible allocations exist in the presence of aggregate uncertainty. Before proceeding, we will discuss aggregate uncertainty and its role in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) .
In McLean and Postlewaite (2002) , three concepts play an important role in constructing individually rational, approximately efficient allocations for private information economies: informational size, variability of beliefs and negligible aggregate uncertainty. The definition of informational size in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) is essentially the same as that presented in this paper. However, McLean and Postlewaite (2002) use a different notion of variability: there we define McLean and Postlewaite (2002) require that the information structure exhibit negligible aggregate uncertainty. Informally, we say that a probability measure P exhibits negligible aggregate uncertainty if, for a set of t's with high probability, P Θ (· | t) ≈ χ θ for some θ ∈ Θ. More formally, define
We define the aggregate uncertainty as µ P ≡ max i µ P i and we will say that P exhibits negligible aggregate uncertainty if µ P is small. In this case, each agent knows that, conditional on his own signal, the aggregate information of all agents will, with high probability, provide a good prediction of the true state. The main result of McLean and Postlewaite (2002) may be stated as follows. 
In the statement of Proposition 3, aggregate uncertainty is small relative to informational variability-max i µ P i δ min i Λ P i -and it is instructive to outline the method of proof for this proposition in order to illustrate the role aggregate uncertainty plays.
Let A = {x(θ)} θ∈Θ be a collection where x(θ) is a strictly individually rational, Pareto efficient allocation for e(θ). In the presence of negligible aggregate uncertainty, we can partition T into m + 1 disjoint sets with A k = {t ∈ T | P (· | t) ≈ χ θ k } for k = 1, . . . , m, and
In words, A k with k 1 is the set of t ∈ T for which the posterior distribution on Θ is close to the degenerate distribution χ θ k that puts probability 1 on θ k . Therefore, A 0 is the set of t ∈ T for which the posterior is not close to χ θ for any θ . We next choose a PIE allocation y(·) with y(t) = x(θ k ) for t ∈ A k , k = 1, . . ., m, and y(t) = w (the initial endowment) for t ∈ A 0 . When aggregate uncertainty is small, the information profile t ∈ T will, with high probability, resolve most of the uncertainty regarding the state of nature θ . There are two consequences of small aggregate uncertainty: the event A 0 has small probability and for each t ∈ A k with k 1, P Θ (θ k | t) is close to 1. Therefore, u
i (y i (t), θ )P Θ (θ | t) is close to u i (x i (θ k ), θ k ) whenever t ∈ A k . Since y(t) is efficient for the economy e(θ k ), the PIE allocation y(·) is approximately ex post efficient for most realizations of the signal profile t.
The PIE y(·) as constructed is not incentive compatible in general. Suppose that i receives signal t i , i reports t i and the other agents truthfully report t −i . If (t −i , t i ) ∈ A 0 , then no trade takes place and i simply consumes his initial endowment. Since each x i (θ k ) is individually rational, agent i has an incentive to misreport if (t −i , t i ) ∈ A k for some k 1. However, the (conditional) probability that (t −i , t i ) ∈ A 0 is small as a consequence of negligible aggregate uncertainty so the utility gain will be small if utility is bounded. Now suppose that (t −i , t i ) ∈ A k for some k 1. Hence, i receives x i (θ k ) if he reports t i . If (t −i , t i ) ∈ A 0 , then i receives his initial endowment and he does not gain by lying. If (t −i , t i ) ∈ A j for some j 1, j = k, he receives x i (θ j ). If x i (θ j ) results in higher utility than x i (θ k ), agent i may have an incentive to misreport. If agent i is informationally small, however, then the (conditional) probability that agent i can 'move' the profile from (t −i , t i ) ∈ A k to (t −i , t i ) ∈ A j (and hence 'move' his allocation from x i (θ k ) to x i (θ j )) is small. Therefore, (t −i , t i ) ∈ A k ∪ A 0 with high probability, i.e., with high probability, no utility gain is possible.
In summary, the negligible aggregate uncertainty implies that the contribution to the total expected gain from lying is small whenever if (t −i , t i ) ∈ A 0 while small informational size implies that the contribution to the total expected gain from lying is small whenever if (t −i , t i ) / ∈ A 0 . Hence, the total expected gain from a lie is small if aggregate uncertainty and agents' informational size are both small. In order to offset this (small) potential gain that i might receive from misreporting, we modify the bundle x i (θ k ) that i receives when t ∈ A k . If the difference between P (θ k | t i ) and P (θ k | t i ) is sufficiently large for different types t i and t i , relative to informational size and aggregate uncertainty, then we can construct a PIE allocation z(t) by slightly modifying each y(t) to ensure incentive compatibility. The final allocation z(·) will be incentive compatible and approximately efficient for nearly all t.
As we have outlined above, incentive compatibility essentially follows from the fact that, with high probability, a lie results in no utility gain. This is a consequence of the partition construction made possible by negligible aggregate uncertainty. If aggregate uncertainty is large, we may still be able to construct an incentive compatible mechanism in which the gains from lying, while not zero with high probability, will be small with high probability. This is accomplished in the next section. The technique involves the construction of an individually rational, efficient allocation z(t) for the expected economy e(t) for each t ∈ T * with associated utilities satisfying a Lipschitzian property: there exists a constant Ksuch that for any two probability distributions P
(· | t −i , t i ) and P (· | t −i , t i ), v i z i (t −i , t i ), P (· | t −i , t i ) − v i z i (t −i , t i ), P (· | t −i , t i ) K P (· | t −i , t i ) − P (· | t −i , t i ) .
While the allocation z(t) is efficient for any vector of announced types, incentive compatibility will typically fail to hold. However, an agent's potential gain from misreporting his type is essentially determined by his informational size. His informational size places a bound on the change in the posterior on Θ he can induce by misreporting, and the Lipschitz property puts a bound on the consequent change in utility. Hence, as an agent's informational size goes to zero, his potential gain from misreporting goes to zero. When informational variability is large enough relative to informational size, the allocation can be slightly modified to insure incentive compatibility, as in the case of negligible aggregate uncertainty. We demonstrate this next.
Informational size, incentive compatibility, and approximate ex post efficiency
Preliminaries and the main approximation lemma
Let {e(θ)} θ∈Θ be a collection of (degenerate) expected economies. For each π ∈ ∆ Θ , let
. . , x n ) is feasible for e(π) .
That is, Φ(π) is the set of feasible utility profiles for the agents in the expected economy e(π). Before proceeding, we will introduce several definitions. A map f : (w i , π) for all π ∈ ∆ Θ and all i ∈ N . The monotonicity, normalization, and non-zero endowment assumptions imply that every individually rational Φ-selection is positive.
We will show that certain PIE allocations can be approximated by incentive compatible PIE allocations when agents are informationally small relative to variability. The idea is as
. , f n (π)) is a feasible utility profile for e(π), there exists an allocation x(π)
= (x 1 (π), . . . , x n (π)) such that f (π) = (v 1 (x 1 (π), π), . .
. , v n (x n (π), π)). Next, define a PIE allocation y(·) where y(t) = x(P Θ (· | t)) for each t ∈ T * and P Θ (· | t) is the posterior distribution on Θ given t. That is, y(t) is an allocation that generates the desired utility for the distribution P Θ (· | t).
Of course, y(·) need not be incentive compatible. When agents are informationally small, however, any agent who unilaterally misreports his type can change the posterior by only a small amount. If the selection f is Lipschitz, then the utility change resulting from that agent's misreport will also be small. When the variability condition is satisfied, agents' types are correlated in a way that allows us to construct small rewards and punishments for the agents. These rewards have the property that, by truthfully announcing his type, an agent maximizes his utility-including his reward-if other agents are announcing truthfully.Given these rewards and punishments, we can modify the allocation y(·) in a way that the modified allocation will be incentive compatible when informational size is small relative to variability for all agents. The next proposition formalizes this. 
there exists an incentive compatible PIE allocation z(·) for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) satisfying
for each t ∈ T * and for all i ∈ N . Moreover,
for all t ∈ T * .
For proof see Appendix A.
The main result for economies of fixed size
Proposition 4 of the previous section provides conditions on the information structure under which the utilities associated with a Lipschitz selection can be approximated by an incentive compatible PIE allocation. We next prove the existence of a Lipschitz selection that gives rise to an approximately efficient, strictly individually rational, incentive compatible PIE allocation.
In the previous subsection, we defined Φ, the correspondence that associates with every π ∈ ∆ Θ the set of feasible utility vectors for the agents in the expected economy e(π), and considered Lipschitz selections from that correspondence. We will now be interested in selections f that have the property that f (π) is on the frontier of the utility possibility set Φ(π) for the expected economy e(π). Toward this end, define Φ 0 (π) = { (v 1 (x 1 , π) , . . . , v n (x n , π)) | (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is efficient and IR for e(π)}. The following definition will be useful in proving our main result. For proof see Appendix A. To prove Lemma 2, we choose π ∈ ∆ Θ and solve the problem
where v(w, π) := (v 1 (w 1 , π) , . . . , v n (w n , π)) and e is the vector of ones in n + . We then choose a feasible allocation x(π) for e(π)
for each i has the desired properties. In this construction, we measure utility along the ray determined by the vector e. Had we measured utility along a different ray, say p where p i > 0 for each i, then the associated maximization problem would have generated a different selection, but one that was still efficient and Lipschitz. Alternatively, we could have maximized the minimal 'weighted' utility gain, where different agents were assigned different weights. These examples illustrate the existence of a large set of Pareto efficient Lipschitz selections that can be approximated by incentive compatible allocations when agents are informationally small. It would be interesting to characterize the set of all such 'weighted' selections, but that is beyond the scope of the present paper.
Using Lemma 2 and Proposition 4 of the previous section, we can prove the following theorem. and if e(P (· | t)) satisfies λ-IR for all t ∈ T * , then there exists a PIE allocation z(·) for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) satisfying XIR, IC, and X ε E.
Proof. Applying Lemma 2, there exists an individually rational Lipschitz selection f for Φ 0 with the property that f i (P (· | t)) − v i (w i , P (· | t)) λ for each i and for each t ∈ T * .
Choose ε > 0 and let 0 < η < min{ε, λ}. Applying Proposition 4, there exists a δ > 0 such that, whenever P ∈ ∆ Θ×T and satisfies
there exists an incentive compatible PIE allocation z(·) for the PIE ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P ) satisfying
for each t ∈ T * and for all i ∈ N . Let ζ(·) be a PIE allocation for ({e(θ)} θ∈Θ ,θ,t, P )
for each i and we conclude that z(t) is individually rational in e(t).
To show that z(t) is ε-efficient in e(t), suppose instead that there exists an allocation y for e(t) such that v i (y i 
for all i contradicting the efficiency of ζ(t) in the expected economy e(t). This completes the proof of Theorem 1. ✷ To conclude this section, we will now describe in somewhat more detail how the results in this paper relate to the main result in McLean and Postlewaite (2002) . Throughout this discussion, we will assume that T = T * .
As suggested in the discussion on aggregate uncertainty, we must follow a different approach when the assumption of negligible aggregate uncertainty is dropped. Instead of choosing a collection A = {x(θ)} θ∈Θ where x(θ) is a strictly individually rational, Pareto efficient allocation for e(θ), we begin with a strictly individually rational Lipschitz selection f from the correspondence Φ 0 . We can 'invert' this Lipschitz selection to generate a mapping ζ from ∆ Θ into allocations such that, for any π ∈ ∆ Θ , ζ(π) is a strictly individually rational, Pareto efficient allocation for the expected economy e(π). In the current paper, the mapping ζ(·) plays a role analogous to that of the collection A = {x(θ)} θ∈Θ in our previous work, and it is important to point out that ζ(·) need not even be continuous on ∆ Θ . For any announced profile of types t, we begin with the allocation ζ(P Θ (· | t)), and then modify it. When agents are informationally small, any agent who unilaterally misreports his type will change the posterior distribution on Θ by only a small amount, and hence, change his resulting utility by only a small amount since his utility depends on P Θ (· | t) in a Lipschitzian manner. As long as variability is sufficiently large relative to informational size, the requisite modifications to ζ(P Θ (· | t)) can be made that ensure incentive compatibility.
The replica problem
In the presence of a large number of agents, we might expect any single agent to be informationally small, and replica economies are a natural framework in which to investigate this conjecture.
Notation and definitions
Let {e(θ)} θ∈Θ be a collection of complete information economies and let J r = {1, 2, . . ., r}. For each positive integer r and each θ , let e r (θ ) = {w is , u is (·, θ)} (i,s)∈N×J r denote the r replication of e(θ) corresponding to state θ satisfying:
(1) w is = w i for all s ∈ J r , (2) u is (z, θ ) = u i (z, θ ) for all z ∈ + , i ∈ N , and s ∈ J r .
For any positive integer r, let T r = T × · · · × T denote the r-fold Cartesian product and let t r = (t r (1), . . ., t r (r)) denote a generic element of T r where t r (s) = (t r 1 (s), . . . , t r n (s)) ∈ T . If P r ∈ ∆ Θ×T r , then e r = ({e r (θ )} θ∈Θ ,θ,t r , P r ) is a PIE with nr agents.
Replica economies and the replica theorem
Definition. A sequence of replica economies {({e r (θ )} θ∈Θ ,θ,t r , P r )} ∞ r=1 is a conditionally independent sequence if there exists a P ∈ ∆ Θ×T with P (θ, t) > 0 for each (θ, t) ∈ Θ × T such that (a) For each r, each s ∈ J r and each (θ, t) ∈ Θ × T ,
(b) For each r and each θ , the random vectors
. ,t r (r)
are independent givenθ = θ . (c) For every θ,θ with θ =θ , there exists a t ∈ T such that P (t | θ) = P (t |θ).
Thus a conditionally independent sequence is a sequence of PIE's with nr agents containing r 'copies' of each agent i ∈ N . Each copy of an agent i is identical, i.e., has the same endowment and the same utility function. Furthermore, the realizations of type profiles across cohorts are independent given the true value ofθ . As r increases each agent is becoming 'small' in the economy in terms of endowment, and each agent is also becoming informationally small. Note that, for large r, an agent may have a small amount of private information regarding the preferences of everyone through his information aboutθ .
Theorem 2. Let {e(θ)} θ∈Θ be a collection of (degenerate) expected economies. Suppose that u i (·, θ) is concave for each i and θ and that the expected economy e(π) has at least one strictly individually rational allocation for each π ∈ ∆ Θ . Let {({e r (θ )} θ∈Θ ,θ,t r , P r )} ∞ r=1 be a conditionally independent sequence. Then for every ε > 0, there exists an integerr > 0 such that for all r >r, there exists an allocation z r for the PIE ({e r (θ )} θ∈Θ ,θ,t r , P r ) which satisfies IC, XIR, and X ε E.
Step 1. Let f be a positive Lipschitz selection for Φ and let K i > 0 denote the modulus of continuity of f i . Since each f i (·) is continuous on ∆ Θ and positive on ∆ Θ , and since ∆ Θ is compact, it follows that there exists a λ > 0 such that f i (π ) λ for all i and π . For each π ∈ ∆ Θ , choose an allocation {ζ i (π )} i∈N for e(π ) satisfying
for each i and note that each ζ i (π ) = 0. Define
Then for each i and π there exists β i (π ) such that 0 < β i (π ) < 1 and
To see this, define
Note that
The continuity of v i (·, π) implies that ψ(·) is continuous and the result follows.
Step 2. Suppose that P ∈ ∆ Θ×T with conditionals P T −i (· | t i ) ∈ ∆ T −i for all i and t i ∈ T i . Next, define
for each t ∈ T (where · 2 denotes the 2-norm) and note that
For each π , i, and t, there exists a number τ π i (t −i , t i ) 0 such that
Defining
it follows that the collections {x i (π | t)} π ∈∆ Θ ,t∈T satisfy
for all t ∈ T . Therefore,
Step 3. For each t ∈ T * , let q(t) = P Θ (· | t) and define a PIE allocation z(·) as follows:
We will now prove that z(·) has the desired properties.
Claim 1. z(·) is a PIE allocation.
Proof. This follows from the observation that
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the definition of z i (t) and the assumption that η < ε. ✷ Claim 3. Let B = 1/(2 √ |T |) and choose δ so that
. (z 1 , π) , . . . , v n (z n , π) = v(w, π ) + σ e.
Since σ > µ(π), we arrive at a contradiction and, therefore, x(π ) is efficient in e(π ).
Next, suppose that the economy e(π ) satisfies λ-IR for some λ > 0. Then using precisely the same argument used above in the proof of efficiency, we can construct a feasible allocation (z 1 , . . . , z n ) for e(π ) satisfying v 1 (z 1 , π) 
A.3. Proof of Theorem 2
Let {({e r (θ )} θ ∈Θ ,θ,t r , P r )} ∞ r=1 be a conditionally independent sequence and suppose that each u i (·, θ) is concave. Since P (θ, t) > 0 for each (θ, t) ∈ Θ × T , it follows from the definition of a conditionally independent sequence that T r = (T r ) * for all r. Choose ε > 0.
